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Lisa  Quadt’s  commentary  focuses  on  my  theory  about  the  multiple  epistemic
strategies humans use to receive information about one other’s mental phenomena.
She develops a principle worry about the theory’s underlying metaphysical found-
ations, arguing that I am committed to an incoherent metaphysical framework. In
this reply, I show that I am not committed to the position she attributes to me and
I outline an alternative framework that is my actual background view. I illustrate
this framework by discussing emotions and argue that emotions are individuated
as integrated patterns of characteristic features. This enables me to combine a
representational account of emotions with a theory of direct perception of basic
emotions as well as with an understanding of some emotions relying on theory-
based inferences. Thus, I have a coherent metaphysics. Finally, I show that the al-
ternative suggested by Quadt has its own problems. 
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1 Introduction
With my PMT (person model theory), I aim to
answer two questions. While the first question
asks which epistemic strategy humans use to ac-
cess the mental states of others and to gather
information  about  them,  the  second  question
asks how the information we obtain to under-
stand others is stored and organized. The an-
swer to the second question is the core of the
PMT. It states that information about other in-
dividuals or types of persons is stored and or-
ganized  in  person  models  and  that  these  are
realized on two levels, i.e. the implicit level of
person schemata and the explicit level of person
images. It further argues that philosophical the-
ories so far have predominately ignored the fact
that  we  usually  understand  others  relying  on
rich  background  information  concerning  them
and their situation. 
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Lisa Quadt’s  commentary focuses  on my
theory concerning the epistemic strategies  hu-
mans use to receive information about others’
mental phenomena, and she develops a principle
worry about the underlying metaphysical found-
ations. I am grateful for this challenge, which
gives me the opportunity  to clarify my back-
ground view. The MV (multiplicity view) out-
lined in the target paper claims that we do not
rely on one epistemic strategy alone, as is sug-
gested by most proposals in the literature, but
that  we  rely  on  a  multiplicity  of  strategies
which, for the most part, are implicitly activ-
ated  on  the  basis  of  contextual  conditions.
These  strategies  include  simulation  strategies,
theory-based  inferences,  and  direct  perception
as well  as  understanding by social  interaction
and  by  relying  on  narratives.  Quadt’s  main
worry is that MV may be based on an incoher-
ent metaphysics and is thus inacceptable as it
stands. In the first part of her reply she aims to
defend  the  incoherence  claim,  while  in  the
second part she offers an alternative metaphys-
ical framework. My reply is  structured as fol-
lows: In the next paragraph I briefly describe
how Quadt defends  her  claim about the sup-
posed  incoherence  of  my  metaphysical  back-
ground and show that I am not committed to
the incoherent framework she attributes to me.
In the second section, I make explicit my actual
background metaphysics (which was not the fo-
cus of my article) and argue that it is coherent,
reinforcing  that  I  am  not  committed  to  the
metaphysics that Quadt attributes to my posi-
tion. Finally, I argue that the alternative meta-
physics suggested by Quadt relies on a distinc-
tion  between  transparency  and  opacity  that
cannot carry the weight it is supposed to carry. 
2 Am I committed to an incoherent 
metaphysics?
Quadt describes correctly that the MV I advoc-
ate combines epistemic strategies that are de-
scribed in several different positions, including
ST (Simulation Theory)  (Goldman 2006),  TT
(Theory-Theory)  (e.g.,  Gopnik &  Meltzoff
1997), and IT (Interaction Theory) (Gallagher
2001),  as  well  as  theory  of  direct  perception
(Gallagher 2008). As a consequence, she presup-
poses that I am committed to the metaphysical
foundations  of  each  of  these  positions,  while
each  position  argues  for  a  distinct  epistemic
strategy. If I were committed to accepting such
metaphysical foundations, I would thereby offer
an incoherent metaphysics. Quadt shows this by
arguing  that  Simulation  Theory  and  Theory-
Theory, on the one hand, presuppose metaphys-
ical claims that are not consistent with the pre-
suppositions from Theories of DP (direct per-
ception) and ITs, on the other hand (3). Quadt
claims that ST and TT are  cognitivist theories
that presuppose internalism, mental representa-
tions, and the idea that mental phenomena are
private hidden entities to which we have no dir-
ect  access.  To  register  mental  phenomena  we
have to rely on perceiving the behaviour and
expressions of  other  people and have to  infer
the existence of mental phenomena. Quite the
opposite  view  is  taken  by  the  non-cognitivist
theories of DP and IT. They allow for external-
ism of mental phenomena (as being realized by
two people and their interaction), they deny the
existence  of  mental  representations,  and  they
presuppose that mental phenomena are not hid-
den but directly perceivable. Thus they rely on
non-inferential access to mental phenomena by
direct  perception.  The  following  quote  illus-
trates the main features of the contrast Quadt
develops: 
The  difference  between  cognitivist  and
non-cognitivist pictures of social cognition,
in the cases that I just described, seems to
boil down to the metaphysical assumption
of whether or not there are hidden cause
in the outside world that require an infer-
ence or representational mechanism in or-
der to access and process them. While ST
and TT clearly assume such a view, DP
denies it. Therefore, I claim that MV can-
not  simply  combine  theoretical  elements
that draw on such considerable metaphys-
ical differences. (Quadt 2015, p. 5)
My first  general reply to this worry is that I
only  take  on  the  description  of  an  epistemic
strategy of  acquiring  and  using  information
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about  other  people  in  order  to  understand
them. An epistemic strategy like a simulation
(to put oneself in the other person’s shoes) or a
theory-based inference is not automatically con-
nected  to  a  metaphysical  commitment.  De
facto, the philosophers who are famous for hold-
ing ST or TT combine their view with a meta-
physical background, but it does not follow that
the  epistemic  strategy  they  describe must  be
combined with  the  metaphysical  background
they offer. We can easily see this for example in
the case of two epistemic strategies like theory-
based inferences and direct perception of mental
phenomena. These can be easily combined in a
way that allows that some mental phenomena
with  intense  expressive  components  like  basic
emotions (Ekman et al. 1972) can be directly
perceived  (see  below),  while  complex  mental
phenomena like propositional attitudes may be
at least often inferred if the social understand-
ing cannot rely on honest utterances but only
on some ambiguous behavioural cues. Thus, the
de  facto  incompatibility  of  the  metaphysical
presuppositions of the two main lines of theories
of social understanding does not imply that I
am  committed  to  inheriting  both  presupposi-
tions  and that  I  thus  run into  an  incoherent
metaphysics. In fact, I do not presuppose two
metaphysical  principles  for  the  same  mental
phenomenon; instead I only need to allow for
the  application  of  two  epistemic  strategies  of
understanding  mental  phenomena,  which  may
be applied to different mental phenomena (or to
the same type of mental phenomenon in differ-
ent situations). In the next section I outline my
alternative metaphysics and illustrate both that
it is coherent and that it can allow for direct
perception as one epistemic strategy for regis-
tering some mental phenomena.
3 Defending direct perception in an 
alternative metaphysical framework
In general, I prefer to think of mental phenom-
ena as representational, but I do not see that
this prevents me from integrating the epistemic
strategy  of  direct  perception.  Furthermore,  I
characterize  basic  emotions  as  realized in  one
individual (individualism but not internalism).
At  the  same  time,  I  remain  neutral  as  to
whether  joint  emotions  (e.g.  joint  enthusiasm
about a goal achieved by one’s team) have to be
analysed as extended emotions. Furthermore, I
think that basic emotions are not hidden mental
phenomena but can be directly perceived e.g. on
the basis of face-based recognition of emotions.
Thus, I think that some mental phenomena can
be  registered  non-inferentially.  But  of  course,
direct perception of some mental phenomena is
only  one of  at  least  four  epistemic  strategies
that we can use, depending on the context. 
To sketch my theory of direct perception I
will  focus  on  basic  emotions  like  anger,  fear,
happiness,  sadness,  etc.  (for a classification of
emotions see  Zinck &  Newen 2008). My meta-
physical view of emotional episodes is that they
are integrated patterns of characteristic features
(Welpinghus & Newen 2012; Newen et al. 2015).
Let me use the example of fear as illustrated in
Newen et  al. (2015):  an  emotional  episode  of
fear towards an aggressive dog is constituted by
the  integration  of  the  following  characteristic
features: (1) a typical physiological arousal that
is  a  consequence  of  bodily  changes  due  to
changes in the autonomic nervous system, in-
cluding increased heart rate and flat breathing;
(2) a typical behavior or behavioral disposition,
including flight or freezing behavior; (3) a typ-
ical facial expression, gesture, or body posture,
etc.;  (4)  a  typical  phenomenal  experience  of
fear; (5) a typical (explicit) cognitive evaluation
of the dog in front of me (e.g., “This is an ag-
gressive  pit  bull”).  Furthermore,  every  emo-
tional episode has (6) an intentional object, i.e.
the dog in front of me. Features 1–5 are integ-
rated into an (often implicit) appraisal of the
intentional object as dangerous. The emotional
episode is constituted by the integration of all
the characteristic features mentioned so far, in-
cluding the appraisal. This view allows that in
another implementation some features would be
missing.  For  example,  the  explicit  cognitive
evaluation of the dog as an aggressive pit bull is
not necessary to be in fear towards the dog in
front of me. Or the facial expression may be in-
hibited,  due  to  intense  training  to  attain  a
poker face, yet I may still be in fear. As long as
a minimum of features is realized, we still have
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an episode of fear. The two main features that
are necessary in all emotional episodes are a re-
gistration of minimal physiological arousal and
an intentional object. The integration of both is
needed  to  have  an  emotional  episode  (Bar-
lassina & Newen 2013). But other features may
be lacking while still remaining characteristic of
most episodes of the relevant type of emotion.
One might wonder why I do not include neural
correlates. Since I argue from a position of ante-
cedent naturalism, neural correlates are not an
extra component in addition to the character-
istic  features  already  mentioned  above.  We
might mention neural correlates as an informat-
ive aspect for the individuation of certain fea-
tures of emotion, but we do not have to, since
they  concern  the  same  features  that  have
already  been  mentioned,  with  information  ac-
cessed in a different manner.
If one accepts the ontology of emotions as
individuated by an integrated pattern of charac-
teristic features, it follows that the expression of
an emotion by face, body posture, and gestures
is a  constitutive  part of the emotional episode
(and not a causal consequence). Thus, I do not
hold  internalism  about  mental  phenomena.
Given this theory of the individuation of emo-
tions, I also argue for the thesis that one way of
recognizing emotions is by perceiving the relev-
ant pattern (Newen et al. 2015). A recognition
of  the other person’s fear can be attained by
directly perceiving the pattern of fear. How can
we account for this, while at the same time ac-
cepting that the feeling of fear is a private sub-
jective experience in so far as a person still may
have the feeling even if  she is able to keep a
poker  face?  Perceiving  fear  is  comparable  to
perceiving a house. Both are processes of pat-
tern recognition on the basis of a minimal pack-
age of characteristic features: I can recognize a
drawing as one of a house, even if one or two of
the characteristic features of a house are miss-
ing. How is this possible? Perceiving an object
is  not  a  purely  passive  process,  like  taking  a
photograph;  it  is  a constructive process.1 One
1 All modern theories of perception account for this constructive compon-
ent, e.g. O’Regan’s and Noë’s theories of enacted perception (O’Regan &
Noë 2001; Noë 2005), as do theories of cognitive penetration (Macpher-
son 2012;  Siegel 2012) and theories of predictive coding (Hohwy 2013;
see alsoHohwy this collection; Clark this collection).
important aspect of the constructive process is
the enrichment of selected core sensory informa-
tion. And one way of realizing this enrichment
is by the activation of a rich memorized mental
image that best suits the core sensory informa-
tion. If we have learned the relevant pattern of
what a house looks like from the outside, and
memorized a respective mental image, then see-
ing a child’s drawing initiates an interaction of
bottom-up and top-down processes.  These  in-
clude the activation of this stored mental image,
such that it enriches the core sensory informa-
tion to form a perceptual experience of seeing a
drawing of  a  house  even if  the  front  door  is
missing in the drawing. 
The same process  of  pattern  recognition
takes place in the case of recognizing an emo-
tion like  fear.  The relevant pattern  of  fear  is
formed either on the basis of having personally
experienced a situation of fear or on the basis of
having observed others in such situations. One
thereby  acquires  a  memorized  pattern  of  fear
with typical features. If one now observes a per-
son with a typical facial  expression in a situ-
ation where she is being attacked by a dog, one
can see the fear of the person. The perception
of fear is realized by seeing the freezing beha-
viour, the facial expression, and the intentional
object (i.e.  the aggressive dog),  because these
features activate as part of the process of per-
ceptual  processing  the  whole  pattern  of  fear.
Thus, I can perceive fear in the face of the per-
son being attacked by the dog. The theory of
perception is one according to which perceptual
processing allows for a systematic enrichment of
information  and  for  influencing  of  perceptual
processes by memorized images or background
knowledge. These top-down influences are dis-
cussed under the label cognitive penetration. So
I am committed to the view of perception as
cognitively penetrated as it is defended in detail
in Vetter & Newen (2014). But this does not in-
volve  any  claims  concerning  the  metaphysical
commitments ascribed to me by Quadt in her
commentary.  Recognition  of  emotions  is  ana-
lysed in a framework that explicitly allows for
mental representations but specifies them in a
way that nevertheless allows for direct percep-
tion as one form of access to the recognition of
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emotions. As has been spelled out in detail else-
where (see Newen et al. 2015), in principle I al-
low for three types of recognizing of emotions:
two types of direct perception are distinguished
in terms of top-down processes of shaping per-
ception involving background images or beliefs;
and one is characterized by theory-based infer-
ences. Thus, I distinguish “(1) (a basic form of)
perceiving an emotion in the (near) absence of
any top-down processes, and (2) perceiving an
emotion  in  a  way  that  significantly  involves
some top-down processes  (a  strongly  concept-
modified form of perception). Both types of per-
ceiving emotions can be distinguished from (3)
inference-based  evaluation  of  an  emotion  pat-
tern. The latter presupposes a stable evaluation
of an emotion as being F, which then may be
modified or reevaluated by reflecting on the in-
formation” (Newen et al. 2015, p. 197). To sum
up: Direct perception can be based on a meta-
physical framework that regards emotions as in-
tegrated patterns of characteristic features and
this allows me to combine it with presupposing
mental representations of emotions (as memor-
ized rich patterns), on the one hand, as well as
with a non-inferential recognition of some emo-
tional episodes on the other. The pattern theory
of emotion is furthermore able to account for in-
ternalistic features of emotions like the feeling
of fear, but also for individualistic yet express-
ive features like behavior and expression in face,
gesture, and body posture. This metaphysics of
emotions  is  coherent  and  is  compatible  with
several  epistemic  strategies  for  recognizing
them, e.g. direct perception as well as theory-
based inferential understanding.
Let me make a further clarificatory remark
about my reply to the coherence worry: I illus-
trated  my metaphysics  taking  emotional  epis-
odes as  a  core example.  This  does not  imply
that  I  analyze  all mental  phenomena  in  this
way. Although I think that some mental phe-
nomena can also be individuated as integrated
patterns  of  characteristic  features  like  self-
awareness/self-consciousness  (see  Gallagher
2013) or object perception, I remain neutral on
the question of how far this analysis can be gen-
eralized  and  about  the  possibility  that  some
mental phenomena need a different metaphysics
as basis. For this reply it is sufficient to have
shown what a concrete paradigmatic example of
a coherent metaphysics for emotional episodes
looks like, in order to prevent the danger of run-
ning into an incoherent  metaphysics  as  a  un-
avoidable consequence of the multiplicity view
concerning epistemic strategies of understanding
others.2
4 Quadt’s proposal FOR an alternative 
metaphysical framework
Although I think I do not need an alternative
metaphysics,  since  I  have  a  coherent  one
already,  I  would  like  to  briefly  comment  on
Quadt’s account. She starts with a remark on
embodiment. I do not really see any serious dis-
agreement with my views here. For it is fine by
me that phenomenal properties and mental rep-
resentations in general are realized within the
body —and sometimes  not  only  in  the  brain
but within our whole body (see the discussion
of emotions). Furthermore, I said that in this
reply I leave open whether we need an extended
realization  basis  for  some  mental  representa-
tions. Quadt’s alternative proposal, with which
she aims to deliver a new framework for a mul-
tiplicity view, introduces different levels of em-
bodiment. One way to read her  distinction is
that  it  offers  a  characterization  of  different
types of representation that unfold during onto-
geny. This basic idea is entirely consistent with
my work. In other papers I discuss in detail the
development of different types of representation
in ontogeny (Newen & Vogeley 2003;  Newen &
Fiebich 2009;  de Bruin &  Newen 2012). There
are of course differences in how one might form
types of representation but discussion of these
goes beyond the scope of this reply. 
Let  me  now  elaborate  on  an  important
point of disagreement. Quadt’s proposal is based,
among other things, on the distinction between
transparent and opaque ways of being involved in
a mental state.  She takes this distinction from
Metzinger (2003, 2004). We can illustrate this dis-
2 Let me highlight that the multiplicity view of understanding others
is only one part of my person model theory and this epistemic aspect
is in addition defended and further developed by my former PhD-
student Anika Fiebich in the following paper which just appeared:
Fiebich & Coltheart 2015.
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tinction using the example of the mental event of
perceiving an apple. This event is transparent if I
am only consciously aware of the apple, while it is
opaque if I am (also) aware of my mental state of
seeing the apple: “[w]hat distinguishes transparent
from opaque states is the degree to which one’s
own social cognitive processing, which is directed
at the other person, is explicitly represented as a
process” (Quadt 2015, p. 12). The relevant move
is Quadt’s claim that the epistemic access of dir-
ect  perception  in  social  cognition  can  be  ex-
plained by transparency, while the epistemic ac-
cess of simulation and theory-based inference can
be explained by opacity. 
Here I think she is on the wrong track. This
distinction between transparency and opacity in
the case of a mental state of attributing a belief
leads to the idea that I am not only aware of the
other person having a belief with content p but
that  I  am also  focussing  on  being  consciously
aware of the process of my attributing a belief to
the other. The latter can of course happen in case
of reflective processes of attributing beliefs; but
normally we are in a mode of just using our abil-
ity to attribute beliefs automatically, focusing on
the other’s belief and its content (not on our own
process of attributing it). We normally deal with
our mental state of attributing beliefs in a trans-
parent way, contrary to the analysis offered by
Quadt. Furthermore,  direct perception can also
be used opaquely in rare cases of being reflect-
ively aware of guiding images: if I am an experi-
enced chess player, I can perceive the chess board
in a way that is best described by cognitive pen-
etration, and in some cases I may be aware of the
mental image which guides my perception, i.e. I
see a position and know how to act because I con-
sciously memorize the fact that I see exactly the
same position I saw in a previously played game.
Thus, the distinction between transparency and
opacity is not helpful for characterizing the differ-
ent  strategies  of  epistemic  access  to  another’s
mental states.
5 Self-models and person models: how 
are they related?
Finally let me point out an important question
raised by Quadt, namely how are person models
and self-models related to each other? A self-
model  is  a  special  type  of  person  model,  the
person model that someone develops of herself.
This is also done at the two levels of an implicit
self-schema and an explicit self-image. I intend
to  elaborate  on  the  interaction  between  self-
models  and  person  model  of  others  in  future
articles,  but  I  completely  agree  with  Quadt
when she  says  that  there  is  bi-directional  in-
formational  exchange  regarding  both  types  of
models  in  humans (which is  also  indicated in
my paper in figure 2, p. 21): “I thus conclude
that it should not only be considered how the
development  of  a  self-model  influences  social
cognition, but also which role social  processes
play in forming such a self-model” (Quadt 2015,
p. 10). The PMT has potential as a framework
for a theory of human self-consciousness.
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